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A Review of African Swine Fever  
and the Potential for introduction 
into the United States and the 
Possibility of Subsequent 
establishment in Feral Swine  
and Native Ticks
Vienna R. Brown1* and Sarah N. Bevins2
1 Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE), Oak Ridge, TN, United States, 2 Wildlife Services, National Wildlife 
Research Center (NWRC), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
Fort Collins, CO, United States
African swine fever (ASF) is caused by African swine fever virus (ASFV), which can cause 
substantial morbidity and mortality events in swine. The virus can be transmitted via 
direct and indirect contacts with infected swine, their products, or competent vector 
species, especially Ornithodoros ticks. Africa and much of Eastern Europe are endemic 
for ASF; a viral introduction to countries that are currently ASF free could have severe 
economic consequences due to the loss of production from infected animals and the 
trade restrictions that would likely be imposed as a result of an outbreak. We identified 
vulnerabilities that could lead to ASFV introduction or persistence in the United States 
or other ASF-free regions. Both legal and illegal movements of live animals, as well as 
the importation of animal products, byproducts, and animal feed, pose a risk of virus 
introduction. Each route is described, and current regulations designed to prevent ASFV 
and other pathogens from entering the United States are outlined. Furthermore, existing 
ASFV research gaps are highlighted. Laboratory experiments to evaluate multiple species 
of Ornithodoros ticks that have yet to be characterized would be useful to understand 
vector competence, host preferences, and distribution of competent soft tick vectors in 
relation to high pig production areas as well as regions with high feral swine (wild boar 
or similar) densities. Knowledge relative to antigenic viral proteins that contribute to host 
response and determination of immune mechanisms that lead to protection are founda-
tional in the quest for a vaccine. Finally, sampling of illegally imported and confiscated 
wild suid products for ASFV could shed light on the types of products being imported 
and provide a more informed perspective relative to the risk of ASFV importation.
Keywords: African swine fever, viral introduction, emergency preparedness, surveillance, domestic pigs, feral 
swine
KeY POiNTS
•	 African	swine	fever	(ASF)	is	caused	by	African	swine	fever	virus	(ASFV),	which	is	the	only	known	
arthropod-borne	DNA	virus.
•	 Currently,	ASF	is	not	present	in	the	United	States,	but	it	is	a	high	consequence,	foreign,	notifiable	
swine	disease,	and	the	economic	consequences	associated	with	an	introduction	could	be	catastrophic.
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•	 The	 virus	 is	 endemic	 in	many	 parts	 of	 the	world,	 including	
most	of	sub-Saharan	Africa,	the	island	of	Sardinia,	and	parts	
of	the	Caucasus	region	and	Eastern	Europe.
•	 The	 routes	 of	 concern	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 ASF	 into	 the	
United	States	are	the	legal	or	illegal	importation	of	live	animals	
(or	their	products)	or	a	bioterrorism	event.
•	 Introduction	 or	 spillover	 events	 from	 domestic	 swine	 into	
feral	 swine	 populations	 would	 substantially	 complicate	 the	
eradication	process	as	would	infection	in	native	Ornithodoros	
tick	species.
•	 Currently,	there	is	no	ASF	vaccine	approved	for	use.
•	 Future	 research	 should	 involve	 (1)	 laboratory	 feeding	
experiments	 to	evaluate	multiple	 species	of	North	American	
Ornithodoros	 ticks	 that	 have	 yet	 to	 be	 characterized,	
(2)	 expanded	 analyses	 to	 explore	 the	 distribution	 and	 host	
preferences	 of	 competent	 soft	 tick	 vectors	 in	 relation	 to	
high	pig	production	regions	as	well	as	high	densities	of	 feral	
swine,	 (3)	 characterization	 of	 antigenic	 viral	 proteins	 that	
contribute	 to	a	host	 immune	response	and	determination	of	
immune	mechanisms	 that	 lead	 to	 protection,	 (4)	 expanding	
classical	swine	fever	slaughter	surveillance	and	random	blood	
collections	 to	 include	screening	for	ASFV,	 in	 the	event	of	an	
increased	risk	of	viral	introduction,	and	(5)	sampling	of	wild	
suid	products	that	were	illegally	imported	and	confiscated	for	
the	detection	of	ASFV.
iNTRODUCTiON
African	 swine	 fever	 (ASF),	 first	 described	 in	 Africa	 in	 the	
1920s,	is	caused	by	African	swine	fever	virus	(ASFV).	Infection	
results	in	high	morbidity	and	mortality	in	swine	and	has	drastic	
implications	 for	 global	 domestic	 swine	 production	 (1).	This	
disease	 is	 reportable	 to	 the	World	 Organisation	 for	 Animal	
Health	 (OIE),	 and	 viral	 infection	 in	 swine	 can	 have	 severe	
economic	 consequences	 associated	 with	 production	 losses,	
trade	limitations,	and	eradication	programs	(2).	Currently,	the	
United	States	is	ASFV	free.	This	article	outlines	what	is	known	
about	ASFV	and	aims	to	describe	existing	gaps	in	knowledge.	
Finally,	a	summary	of	US	vulnerabilities	for	viral	introduction	
and	persistence	 is	 provided.	Countries	with	 endemic	ASF	 in	
domestic	 swine	 likely	have	a	different	 set	of	 challenges	com-
pared	to	the	United	States	and	other	ASF-free	regions	and	may	
benefit	from	the	development	of	disease	control	methods	that	
are	 commonly	 used,	 such	 as	 enforceable	 quarantine	 zones,	
diagnostic	 assays,	 and	 culling	 of	 infected	 animals.	 However,	
eradicating	a	disease	that	 is	established	in	a	wild	population,	
such	as	wild	boar,	 is	highly	 complex	and	depends	on	a	deep	
understanding	of	the	disease	ecology	within	a	specific	epide-
miological	context.
viRUS DeSCRiPTiON
African	 swine	 fever	 virus	 is	 a	 large,	 enveloped	 virus	 in	 the	
Asfarviridae	family	that	causes	hemorrhagic	diseases	in	domestic	
pigs	and	several	species	of	wild	swine	(3).	The	virus	is	a	geneti-
cally	complex	double-stranded	DNA	virus	that	contains	a	series	
of	 genes	 used	 for	 virulence,	 immune	 evasion,	 and	 cell	 process	
modulation	 (4).	 Twenty-three	 genotypes	 have	 been	 described	
based	on	the	partial	sequences	of	the	p72	gene	(5,	6).	All	23	geno-
types	are	present	in	Africa,	whereas	only	genotypes	I	and	II	have	
been	found	outside	of	that	continent.	The	virus	primarily	infects	
cells	 of	 the	 mononuclear	 phagocytic	 system	 (monocytes	 and	
macrophages)	and	replicates	in	the	cytoplasm.	The	endoplasmic	
reticulum	is	believed	to	play	an	important	role	in	viral	assembly	
and	ASFV	envelopment	(3,	4,	7).
TRANSMiSSiON AND CLiNiCAL DiSeASe
African	 swine	 fever	 virus	 can	 be	 transmitted	 via	 direct	
contact	with	 infected	animals,	 either	domestic	 swine	or	wild	
boar,	 indirect	contact	via	contaminated	fomites	or	uncooked	
meat	 from	 infected	 animals,	 or	 through	 arthropod	 vectors,	
particularly	soft	tick	species	in	the	genus	Ornithodoros	(1,	8).	
The	virus	is	highly	stable	in	proteinaceous	environments	and	
quite	resistant	to	high	temperatures,	requiring	60°C	for	20 min	
for	inactivation.	Domestic	pig-to-pig	transmission	is	thought	
to	occur	primarily	through	infection	of	the	upper	respiratory	
tract	 as	 domestic	 pigs	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 shed	 infectious	
virus	from	all	secretions	and	excretions,	with	particularly	high	
concentrations	 in	 the	oronasal	fluid.	ASFV	 is	very	persistent	
in	blood	and	tissues	after	death;	thus,	an	opportune	vehicle	to	
transmit	 infection	 is	 feeding	 uncooked	 swill.	 Environmental	
contamination	 following	 necropsies,	 pig	 fights	 that	 result	 in	
bloodshed,	 or	 bloody	 diarrhea	 following	 infection	may	 also	
serve	as	a	route	for	new	infections.	Airborne	transmission	has	
been	demonstrated	in	a	laboratory	setting	where	animals	were	
densely	housed	(9).
Ornithodoros	ticks	have	also	been	found	to	serve	as	biological	
vectors	 for	 ASFV,	 with	 documented	 transstadial,	 transovarial,	
and	sexual	transmission	(10).	In	some	regions	of	Africa,	ASFV	
cycles	 between	 juvenile	 common	 warthogs	 and	 Ornithodoros 
porcinus porcinus	ticks,	which	inhabit	their	burrows.	In	Europe,	
Ornithodoros erraticus	have	been	found	to	vector	ASFV	and	were	
involved	 in	 the	disease	 epidemiology	on	 the	 Iberian	Peninsula	
between	 the	 1960s	 and	 1990s;	 however,	 O. erraticus	 are	 not	
involved	 in	 the	 current	 ASF	 scenario	 in	 Eastern	 Europe	 and	
Sardinia.	Biting	flies,	particularly	Stomoxys spp,	have	been	found	
to	be	capable	of	mechanical	transmission	for	ASFV	(11).
Domestic	 swine,	Eurasian	wild	boar,	warthogs,	bushpigs,	
and	 giant	 forest	 hogs	 are	 all	 susceptible	 to	 infection	 with	
ASFV;	 however,	 warthogs	 and	 bushpigs	 generally	 develop	
asymptomatic	 infections	 and	 serve	 as	 a	 viral	 reservoir,	 in	
what	 is	often	referred	to	as	 the	sylvatic	cycle	(12).	Peccaries	
are	 thought	 to	 be	 resistant	 to	 infection.	 Neonatal	 warthogs	
develop	 a	 sufficient	 viremia	 to	 infect	 new	 ticks	 but	 do	 not	
develop	 clinical	disease,	 and	adult	warthogs	 are	 impervious	
to	the	pathogenic	effects	of	the	virus	although	the	virus	can	
be	 often	 extracted	 from	 their	 lymph	 nodes	 (13).	 ASFV	 has	
a	predilection	for	lymph	nodes	near	the	head,	and	warthogs	
remain	infected	for	 life	(14).	Neither	horizontal	nor	vertical	
transmission	has	been	documented	in	warthogs,	with	soft	ticks	
serving	as	the	sole	route	of	transmission	between	infected	and	
susceptible	warthogs	 (1,	 15,	 16).	 Sexual	 transmission	 is	 not	
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indicated	in	warthogs;	however,	the	virus	is	found	in	genital	
secretions	and	 so	 it	 remains	a	possibility	 (1).	To	date,	 there	
has	 been	 no	 conclusive	 data	 suggesting	 a	 long-term	 carrier	
state;	 however,	 a	 survey	 conducted	 in	 central	 Kenya	 found	
ASFV	 [detected	 via	 polymerase	 chain	 reaction	 (PCR)]	 in	
asymptomatic	domestic	swine	and	warthogs	(17).
Experimental	 infection	 of	 bushpigs	 demonstrated	 the	
absence	 of	 clinical	 disease	 despite	 a	 robust	 viremia	 lasting	
35–91 days	following	infection	with	ASFV,	which	was	sufficient	
to	 infect	 O. porcinus porcinus	 ticks	 that	 fed	 on	 the	 bushpigs	
during	 their	 viremic	 period	 (18).	 Infected	 ticks	 were	 able	
to	 transmit	 ASFV	 to	 naive	 domestic	 pigs.	 Certain	 strains	 of	
ASFV	 in	 experimentally	 inoculated	bushpigs	were	 capable	 of	
transmission	via	direct	contact	with	domestic	swine,	whereas	
other	strains	were	not.	Infected	domestic	swine	were	not	able	
to	transmit	the	infection	to	in-contact	bushpigs,	suggesting	that	
they	are	not	as	readily	infected	via	direct	contact	compared	to	
domestic	swine.
Clinical	 disease	 can	 manifest	 in	 multiple	 ways	 ranging	
from	death	with	 no	 signs	 (peracute,	mortality	 ~100%)	 to	 an	
asymptomatic	infection;	however,	most	isolates	of	ASFV	cause	
acute	hemorrhagic	fever	in	domestic	pigs	and	result	in	mortal-
ity	nearing	100%	(1,	19).	All	age	groups	of	pigs	have	been	found	
to	 be	 equally	 susceptible	 to	 ASFV	 infection,	 as	 opposed	 to	
classical	swine	fever	virus	(CSFV)	where	young	pigs	are	much	
more	 susceptible	 (20).	Acute	 infections	 are	 caused	 by	 highly	
virulent	strains	and	are	typically	characterized	by	a	high	fever,	
anorexia,	 lethargy,	 weakness,	 recumbancy,	 diarrhea	 and/or	
constipation,	abdominal	pain,	hemorrhagic	signs,	respiratory	
distress,	 nasal	 and	 conjunctival	 discharge,	 and	 abortions	 in	
pregnant	 females.	Death	 often	occurs	within	 7–10 days	 after	
the	 onset	 of	 clinical	 signs.	 Depending	 on	 the	 virulence	 of	
the	ASFV	 strain,	 acute	 infections	 are	 often	 the	 predominant	
form	at	 the	beginning	of	an	outbreak	 in	disease-free	regions;	
however,	 once	 established,	 the	 disease	 often	 progresses	 to	
subacute	 clinical	 forms	 that	 can	be	 sustained	over	 time	 (20).	
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 this	 pattern	 has	 been	 previously	
observed	although	 it	 is	not	 the	established	 truth.	Moderately	
virulent	 strains	 result	 in	 subacute	 infection	 (often	with	 high	
mortality	in	young	animals	and	much	lower	mortality	in	older	
animals)	where	the	clinical	signs	often	include	abortion,	fever,	
and	transient	hemorrhaging	with	death	or	recovery	occurring	
within	3–4 weeks.	Chronic	 infections	 (mortality	 is	 very	 low)	
are	characterized	by	intermittent	or	low	fever,	appetite	loss,	and	
depression	and,	 in	 some	 instances,	 result	 in	a	 fatal	 infection.	
Animals	that	remain	persistently	infected	for	months,	such	as	
survivors	or	subclinically	or	chronically	infected	pigs,	may	play	
a	 role	 in	disease	persistence	 in	 endemic	 regions.	Also,	 it	 has	
been	speculated	that	they	may	contribute	to	sporadic	outbreaks	
and	introductions	to	ASFV-free	zones	(20).
Domestic	 pigs	 are	 most	 infectious	 during	 the	 incubation	
period	and	may	shed	virus	for	>48 hours	prior	to	the	presentation	
of	clinical	disease	(1).	Recovered	pigs	may	shed	infectious	virus	
for	1	month	after	the	disappearance	of	clinical	signs.	Pig	popula-
tions	that	have	developed	a	degree	of	resistance	to	the	virus	are	
better	able	to	maintain	and	circulate	ASFV	as	the	disease	is	not	
self-limiting	(21,	22).
GLOBAL DiSTRiBUTiON AND 
ePiDeMiOLOGY
African	swine	fever	was	restricted	to	the	African	continent	from	
its	first	description	in	the	1920s	until	1957	when	an	outbreak	was	
reported	in	Portugal	(23).	This	outbreak	was	effectively	controlled	
and	eradicated	until	a	second	recurrence	in	1960,	which	resulted	
in	ASF	 being	 endemic	 in	 the	 Iberian	 Peninsula	 (Portugal	 and	
Spain)	until	1995.	During	the	1970s	and	1980s,	ASF	emerged	in	
several	parts	of	 the	world,	 including	other	European	countries	
(the	Netherlands,	Italy,	France,	and	Belgium)	and	the	Americas	
(Cuba,	 the	 Dominican	 Republic,	 Haiti,	 and	 Brazil)	 (16).	This	
global	 spread	 is	 thought	 to	 be	due	 largely	 to	 feeding	domestic	
animals	contaminated	pork	products	that	entered	each	region	via	
international	air	 and	 seaports.	After	establishment	 in	domestic	
swine	herds,	infected	pigs	and	pork	products	became	the	primary	
source	of	infection.
On	the	basis	of	the	ability	of	ASFV	to	be	transmitted	via	direct	
and	indirect	contacts	and	through	an	arthropod	vector,	Sánchez-
Vizcaíno	 et  al.	 (23)	 outline	 five	 epidemiological	 scenarios	 and	
examples	 of	 regions	 where	 each	 type	 of	 situation	 occurred,	
depending	on	the	existence	of	wild	reservoirs	and	competent	tick	
vectors.	The	first	scenario	involves	the	original	natural	cycle	and	
describes	transmission	in	Eastern	and	Southern	Africa	in	which	a	
sylvatic	cycle	occurs	between	wild	suids,	especially	warthogs,	and	
O. porcinus porcinus	ticks.	Spillover	into	domestic	swine	is	typi-
cally	associated	with	infected	tick	bites	or	ingestion	of	contami-
nated	warthog	meat.	A	second	scenario	describes	 transmission	
occurring	primarily	through	direct	contact	between	infected	and	
susceptible	domestic	pigs	and	indirect	contact	between	suscepti-
ble	pigs	and	contaminated	pork	products.	Ticks	are	not	involved.	
This	describes	ASF	dynamics	 in	many	West	African	countries.	
Third,	as	was	observed	on	the	Iberian	Peninsula,	both	wild	boar	
and	 domestic	 pigs	 were	 infected,	 and	 transmission	 primarily	
occurred	 via	 direct	 contact	 between	 infected	 and	 susceptible	
animals	and	via	the	consumption	of	infected	meat.	O. erraticus	
contributed	 to	 transmission	 in	 outdoor	 production	 systems;	
however,	this	tick	species	is	only	capable	of	transstadial	transmis-
sion	but	not	transovarial,	and	therefore,	their	vector	competency	
is	 lower	 than	O. porcinus porcinus.	 Between	 1968	 and	 1980	 in	
Central	and	South	America,	a	 fourth	scenario	was	observed	in	
which	the	disease	only	affected	domestic	pigs	and	neither	wild	
suids	 nor	 ticks	were	 involved.	This	 scenario	 is	much	 easier	 to	
eradicate	compared	to	all	others.	The	fifth	scenario	occurred	in	
Russia	and	the	trans-Caucasian	countries	where	both	wild	boar	
and	domestic	pigs	were	involved	in	transmission	but	ticks	were	
not	found	to	be	involved.	Most	outbreaks	were	found	in	domestic	
pigs	and	were	linked	to	movements	of	affected	animals	and	their	
products.	Understanding	the	epidemiology	of	disease,	specific	to	
the	region	of	interest,	is	crucial	as	the	development	of	emergency	
control	and	eradication	plans	are	dependent	upon	disease	trans-
mission	patterns	and	risk	factors.
iMMUNe ReSPONSe TO ASFv
Infection	 with	 ASFV	 is	 characterized	 by	 severe	 immunosup-
pression	and	apoptosis,	primarily	replicating	in	monocytes	and	
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macrophages,	and	is	believed	to	enter	cells	via	receptor-mediated	
endocytosis	(24,	25).	Activated	macrophages	release	IL-1,	IL-6,	
and	TNFα,	which	all	contribute	to	acute-phase	reactions,	inflam-
mation,	activation	of	endothelial	cells,	and	apoptosis	(26).	Similar	
cell	tropism	and	organ	distribution	have	been	observed	across	all	
strains	of	ASFV;	however,	more	severe	tissue	destruction	is	asso-
ciated	with	strains	of	increasing	virulence.	Neutralizing	antibod-
ies	and	CD8+	T cells	and	natural	killer	cells	are	believed	to	play	
an	 important	 role	 in	 the	host	 immune	 response	 against	ASFV.	
In vitro	experiments	suggest	that	some	cellular	mechanisms	are	
regulated	by	ASFV	via	the	encoding	of	specific	regulatory	genes	
and	 by	 interaction	 with	 viral	 and	 cellular	 proteins;	 however,	
most	cellular	functions	altered	after	infection	remain	unknown	
(25).	Proteomic	evaluation	demonstrated	that	ASFV	shuts	down	
the	majority	 of	 protein	 synthesis,	 affecting	 approximately	 65%	
of	 cellular	proteins.	 Specific	 cellular	proteins	were	 found	 to	be	
overexpressed	after	ASFV	infection,	and	most	were	involved	in	
redox	homeostasis,	programmed	cell	death,	and	coagulation.
The	 role	 of	 neutralizing	 antibodies	 has	 been	 evaluated,	 and	
results	 are	 variable.	 Passive	 transfer	 experiments	 performed	 in	
domestic	swine	by	Onisk	et al.	(27)	found	that	85%	of	pigs	that	
received	the	anti-ASFV	IgG	survived	challenge	compared	to	0%	
of	unimmunized	controls.	Treated	animals	underwent	transient	
fever	but	otherwise	appeared	clinically	normal.	Viremia	in	pigs	
that	received	the	antibody	transfer	was	found	to	be	delayed	and	
reduced.
Viral	 neutralizing	 epitopes	 were	 identified	 on	 three	 viral	
capsid	proteins—p30,	p54,	and	p72—and	domestic	 swine	were	
immunized	using	a	baculovirus	expressing	each	of	these	proteins	
prior	 to	 challenge	 with	 a	 homologous	 virus	 (28).	 Immunized	
animals	were	found	to	have	a	2-day	delay	in	the	onset	of	clinical	
disease	and	a	reduced	viremia,	but	there	was	no	effect	on	disease	
development,	 progression,	 or	 outcome.	The	 authors	 concluded	
that	 neutralizing	 antibodies	 to	 these	ASFV	 proteins	 are	 insuf-
ficient	for	antibody-mediated	protection.
The	findings	by	Onisk	et al.	(27)	and	Neilan	et al.	(28)	appear	
to	be	in	stark	contrast	to	one	another,	and	differences	are	believed	
to	be	due	in	part	to	variations	in	virus	strains	(and	subsequently,	
virulence)	and	challenge	doses.	The	relative	role	of	neutralizing	
antibodies	may	be	dependent	on	the	virulence	of	the	ASFV	isolate	
used,	with	neutralizing	antibodies	providing	a	more	protective	
response	against	less	virulent	strains.	However,	large	differences	
in	study	design	between	the	two	experiments	make	comparison	
very	difficult	as	Onisk	and	colleagues	used	passive	transfer,	which	
is	a	mixture	of	numerous	antibodies	compared	 to	Neilan	et al.	
(28)	who	immunized	swine	with	specific	epitopes.	Much	further	
characterization	of	the	role	of	antibodies	is	required.
Interestingly,	in	northern	Mozambique,	a	region	endemic	for	
ASF,	a	population	of	domestic	pigs	were	found	to	have	high	levels	
of	 circulating	 antibodies	 to	 ASFV	 (29).	 A	 group	 of	 pigs	 from	
this	 population	were	 collected	 and	 their	 offspring	were	 evalu-
ated	 through	 experimental	ASFV	 challenge	 for	 the	 heritability	
of	this	resistance	to	ASF.	The	offspring	were	acutely	susceptible	
to	challenge	with	a	virulent	strain	of	ASFV,	suggesting	that	the	
ASFV	 resistance	 in	 the	 parental	 population	 was	 not	 heritable.	
The	authors	hypothesize	that	this	observed	resistance	is	resultant	
from	(1)	prior	exposure	to	a	less	virulent	but	antigenically	similar	
field	 virus	 prior	 to	 exposure	 to	 a	 virulent	 strain,	 (2)	maternal	
antibody	resistance,	(3)	exposure	to	small	quantities	of	infectivity	
that	may	result	in	a	sublethal	infection	that	confers	immunity	to	
a	subsequent	challenge	(29).
veCTOR BiOLOGY
As	stated	previously,	several	soft	tick	species	have	been	implicated	
in	 ASFV	 transmission	 in	 endemic	 and	 outbreak	 regions.	 It	 is	
important	to	note	that	the	taxonomy	of	the	O. porcinus porcinus	
ticks	has	changed	over	time	on	the	basis	of	both	morphological	
and	biological	characteristics.	Prior	to	1979,	O. porcinus porcinus	
ticks	were	 often	 referred	 to	 as	Ornithodoros moubata porcinus	
or	simply	Ornithodoros moubata.	The	O. moubata	complex	was	
then	 split	 into	 four	 distinct	 species,	 including	 Ornithodoros 
porcinus,	which	was	further	divided	into	O. porcinus porcinus	and	
Ornithodoros porcinus domesticus	(30).	However,	in	much	of	the	
current	literature	O. moubata	and	O. porcinus porcinus	are	used	
interchangeably.
Plowright	et al.	 (31)	demonstrated	that	O. porcinus porcinus	
could	 be	 infected	 with	 multiple	 strains	 of	 ASFV	 and	 develop	
a	 persistent	 infection	 although	 the	 minimum	 infective	 dose	
varied	 between	 strains.	 Furthermore,	 experimental	 challenges	
confirmed	 that	 infected	 ticks	 could	 readily	 transmit	 ASFV	 to	
domestic	pigs.	Later	studies	determined	that	O. porcinus porcinus	
could	 transmit	 the	 infection	 transovarially;	however,	 there	was	
tremendous	variability	between	egg	batches	from	different	ticks	
and	 between	 successive	 egg	 batches	 from	 the	 same	 tick	 (32).	
Interestingly,	 it	was	 found	 that	 the	 prevalence	 of	 infected	 eggs	
increases	after	each	successive	infected	blood	meal.	O. porcinus 
porcinus	 ticks	 have	 been	 found	 to	 maintain	 high	 ASFV	 titers	
over	time,	and	no	cytopathological	lesions	have	been	observed	in	
these	ticks,	suggesting	that	O. porcinus porcinus	ticks	and	ASFV	
are	 co-adapted	 and	 likely	 represent	 a	 co-evolved	 system	 (33).	
ASFV	follows	a	common	virus–tick	pathway	upon	ingestion	of	an	
infective	blood	meal,	viral	replication	in	the	midgut,	escape	into	
the	hemocoel,	and	infection	of	the	coxal	and	salivary	glands	(34).
While	O. porcinus porcinus	 ticks	are	 involved	 in	 the	sylvatic	
cycle	 of	 ASFV	 with	 warthogs,	 other	 Ornithodoros	 species	 are	
capable	 of	 transmitting	 infection.	 O. erraticus,	 found	 in	 the	
Mediterranean	and	Middle	East,	was	implicated	in	ASFV	trans-
mission,	 and	 longitudinal	monitoring	 found	 higher	 titers	 over	
time,	which	is	suggestive	of	viral	replication	(35).
Several	Ornithodoros	 species	 are	 indigenous	 to	 North	 and	
Central	America,	as	well	as	the	Caribbean.	Experimental	infec	-
tions	 in	 Ornithodoros coriaceus, Ornithodoros parkeri,	 and	
Ornithodoros turicata	 (Americas)	 and	 Ornithodoros puertori-
censis	 (Caribbean)	 have	 been	 performed	 with	multiple	 ASFV	
isolates	(33).	O. coriaceus	ticks	were	infected	with	five	different	
isolates	 of	 ASFV,	 and	 viral	 persistence	 was	 found	 to	 range	
between	77	and	463 days,	with	transmission	to	domestic	swine	
demonstrated	at	502 days	postinfection	with	 the	DR	II	 strain.	
O. parkeri	were	challenged	with	one	strain	of	ASFV	and	found	
to	be	infected	for	46 days	postinfection,	whereas	O. turicata	were	
found	to	be	infected	for	23 days	postinfection.	O. puertoricensis	
ticks	were	 infected	with	 a	 single	 isolate	of	ASFV	and	demon-
strated	transmission	to	domestic	pigs	at	239 days	postinfection.	
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In	 addition,	 transovarial	 and	 transstadial	 transmission	 were	
demonstrated;	however,	transmission	rates	decreased	with	each	
molt.	 Importantly,	despite	 the	presence	of	O. puertoricensis	 in	
Haiti	and	the	Dominican	Republic,	it	did	not	appear	to	compli-
cate	ASFV	eradication	in	1978,	likely	due	to	the	lack	of	contact	
between	 infected	 pigs	 and	 ticks	 (36).	 For	 a	 comprehensive	
overview	of	vector	competency	with	different	isolates	of	ASFV,	
please	see	the	study	by	Kleiboeker	and	Scoles	(33).
ASF AND eUROPeAN SPReAD
African	swine	fever	 is	endemic	 in	much	of	Africa	but	was	first	
introduced	outside	of	the	African	continent	into	Portugal	in	1957	
and	again	in	1960	(37).	The	most	likely	route	of	introduction	was	
via	 ASFV-contaminated	 swill	 as	 this	 is	 a	 very	 effective	means	
of	spreading	the	virus	over	long	distances.	The	disease	was	first	
discovered	in	swill-fed	swine	near	the	Lisbon	airport,	which	fur-
thers	the	hypothesis	that	the	virus	was	introduced	via	this	route.	
ASFV	then	spread	to	Spain	and	remained	endemic	on	the	Iberian	
Peninsula	until	the	1990s.	Once	introduced,	ASF	is	especially	dif-
ficult	to	eradicate	due	to	the	presence	of	wildlife	reservoirs	and	
competent	soft	tick	vectors,	the	lack	of	a	vaccine,	and	insufficient	
laboratory	 support	 for	 rapid	 and	 accurate	 diagnosis	 (38).	 It	 is	
important	to	note	that	the	role	of	wild	boar	in	the	maintenance	
and	transmission	of	ASFV	varies	significantly	based	on	disease	
epidemiology	 and	 ecology.	Wild	 boars	 were	 involved	 to	 some	
extent	in	the	epidemiology	of	ASF	on	the	Iberian	Peninsula,	but	
they	did	not	appear	to	complicate	control	measures,	which	is	in	
strict	contrast	to	the	current	scenario	in	Eastern	Europe	where	
ASF	has	become	established	in	wild	boar	populations	independ-
ent	of	domestic	pigs	 (39).	Between	1960	and	1986,	 the	disease	
emerged	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 European	 countries,	 including	 France,	
Madeira,	 Italy,	 including	 the	 island	 of	 Sardinia,	 Belgium,	 the	
Netherlands,	 and	Malta	 (37,	 40,	 41).	 Extensive	 control	 has	 led	
to	eradication	in	these	countries,	except	for	Sardinia,	where	the	
disease	has	been	endemic	since	1978	(20).
In	 June	2007,	ASFV	was	 introduced	 to	 the	Caucasus	region	
of	Georgia,	presumably	from	catering	waste	containing	infected	
meat	from	ships	docked	at	the	Black	Sea	Port	of	Poti	(38).	The	
virus	 spread	quickly	 throughout	 the	country	and	by	 July	2007,	
ASFV	was	found	in	56	of	the	61	districts	in	Georgia.	By	August	
2007,	ASF	was	found	in	neighboring	Armenia	and	by	November	
2007	 was	 found	 in	 Azerbaijan	 and	 Russia.	 In	 2014,	 outbreaks	
were	reported	in	parts	of	the	European	Union,	including	Poland,	
Lithuania,	Latvia,	and	Estonia	and	the	first	detections	in	each	of	
these	countries	were	in	wild	boar	found	dead	(42).	Epidemiological	
investigations	from	Lithuania	and	Latvia	suggest	that	fresh	grass	
and	 seeds	 contaminated	with	ASFV	 from	 infectious	wild	 boar	
served	as	the	source	of	infection	for	pigs	on	backyard	farms	(43).	
The	 viral	 amplification	 in	 backyard	pigs	 then	 served	 as	 a	 viral	
source	 for	 other	 backyard	 farms	 and	 commercial	 piggeries.	 In	
2017,	 ASF	was	 reported	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 and	 Romania,	
and	between	January	and	September	2017,	the	Animal	Disease	
Notification	System	received	notifications	of	about	3,700	cases	in	
wild	boar	and	approximately	140	cases	in	domestic	swine	from	
the	6	EU	member	 states,	 including	Sardinia	 (44).	 Interestingly,	
models	of	the	most	current	epidemiological	situation	suggest	that	
the	most	 important	risk	estimator	for	ASF	spread	into	disease-
free	EU	countries	 is	wild	boar	habitat	 and	 the	 least	 significant	
estimator	is	wild	boar	density;	thus,	indicating	that	the	presence	
of	wild	 boar	 is	more	 important	 than	 density	 (45).	This	model	
can	be	used	to	identify	countries	that	are	at	higher	risk	for	ASF	
introduction	through	wild	boar.
Experimental	inoculation	of	wild	boar	with	an	ASFV	isolate	
from	 the	Caucasus	 region	 found	 that	 the	 infection	 resulted	 in	
uniform	 lethality,	 and	 the	 authors	 concluded	 that	 this	 highly	
virulent	strain	would	be	unsuitable	for	viral	endemicity	within	
the	native	population	of	wild	boar	(46).	Despite	 this	assertion,	
field	observations	show	that	the	virus	can	persist	independently	
in	wild	boar	despite	high	virulence.	Importantly,	a	low-dose	chal-
lenge	of	wild	boar	with	Caucasus	region	isolates	of	ASFV	were	
found	 to	 be	 sufficient	 to	 result	 in	 infection	 of	weak	 or	 runted	
animals	(47).	Once	 infected,	 these	poor-doing	wild	boar	could	
then	serve	to	amplify	ASFV	to	levels	that	were	capable	of	infect-
ing	 apparently	healthy	herd	mates.	The	exact	mechanism	with	
which	highly	virulent	strains	of	ASFV	are	being	maintained	in	
wild	 boar	 populations	 is	 unknown;	 however,	 in	 several	 epide-
miological	scenarios,	it	has	become	clear	that	ASFV	can	persist	
independently	in	wild	boar	populations.
Competent	vector	 species,	namely	O. erraticus	 ticks,	 found	
on	the	Iberian	Peninsula	also	contribute	to	difficulty	eradicating	
the	virus	once	introduced.	Portugal	was	declared	free	of	ASFV	
in	1993,	but	the	virus	re-emerged	on	a	single	farm	in	1999	and	
ASFV-infected	O. erraticus	 ticks	 in	 1993	 are	 suggested	 as	 the	
route	of	introduction	(48).	Ticks	were	collected	from	farms	that	
were	depopulated	due	to	ASF	and	evaluated	for	 their	capacity	
to	 maintain	 an	 ASFV	 infection	 and	 transmit	 to	 susceptible	
domestic	swine.	Cell	culture	was	used	to	evaluate	tick	infection,	
and	four	adult	ticks	were	found	to	be	positive	using	cell	culture	
alone	 and	 another	 six	 adult	 ticks	 were	 found	 to	 be	 positive	
using	both	cell	culture	and	PCR	or	direct	immunofluorescence.	
8.8%	of	tested	farms	were	found	to	have	infected	ticks,	and	this	
infection	could	lead	to	virus	isolation	2.5–5.25 years	following	
the	 last	 possible	 ASFV	 exposure.	 Transmission	 to	 susceptible	
domestic	swine	occurred	2.3 years	after	the	last	possible	expo-
sure	to	ASFV.	These	findings	suggest	that	the	current	European	
Administration	regulations	on	ASF,	where	an	infected	property	
can	be	restocked	40 days	after	an	outbreak	in	the	absence	of	soft	
tick	vectors,	and	the	requirement	of	a	6-year	quarantine	if	soft	
tick	vectors	are	present,	are	appropriate	(49).	Furthermore,	it	is	
a	distinct	possibility	that	long-lived	ASFV-infected	O. erraticus	
ticks	caused	the	single	farm	outbreak	of	ASF	in	1999	after	the	
eradication	in	Portugal.	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	this	
finding	was	related	to	a	very	old	and	traditional	housing	of	pigs,	
using	pig	sties	in	which	soft	ticks	could	become	established.	By	
using	modern	pig	production	methods,	a	soft	tick	infestation	is	
unlikely.
DOMeSTiC SwiNe iN THe UNiTeD 
STATeS
The	overwhelming	majority	of	the	65	million	pigs	in	the	United	
States	are	managed	indoors	under	high	biosecurity	conditions.	
FiGURe 1 | Distribution of pig production within the United States, 2012. (Figure courtesy by United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (2015), used with permission.)
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Figure  1	 illustrates	 the	distribution	of	pig	production	within	
the	United	States	from	2012	(50),	with	Iowa,	North	Carolina,	
Minnesota,	Illinois,	and	Indiana	being	the	five	top	pork	produc-
ing	states	annually.	Commercial	swine	production	 is	a	closed	
system	from	farrowing	through	slaughter	as	a	means	to	reduce	
the	 risk	 of	 pathogen	 introduction	 (Personal	 communication,	
2016).	 Animal	 feed,	 transport	 vehicles,	 personnel,	 and	 other	
fomites	are	also	closely	managed	to	limit	cross-contamination.	
However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 despite	 the	 biosecurity	
measures	 in	place	 in	 the	 commercial	 swine	 industry,	porcine	
epidemic	 diarrhea	 virus	 (PEDV)	 entered	 the	 United	 States	
in	 2013,	 and	 epidemiological	 analyses	 suggest	 that	 transport	
equipment	 contributed	 to	 viral	 spread	 (51).	 Moreover,	 in	
summer	 2014	 in	 northeast	 Lithuania,	 ASFV	 was	 introduced	
to	an	industrial	pig	farm	that	was	intensively	managed	with	a	
closed	cycle	and	very	 strict	biosecurity	measures	 resulting	 in	
the	death	or	euthanasia	of	>20,000	pigs	(20).	These	examples	
demonstrate	that	despite	stringent	biosecurity	protocols	and	a	
vertically	integrated	industry,	it	can	still	be	difficult	to	control	
pathogens.
For	ASF	vector-borne	transmission,	however,	it	is	unlikely	
that	ticks	would	interact	with	domestic	swine	raised	in	com-
mercial	 facilities.	 However,	 hobbyists	 and	 backyard	 farmers	
often	have	domestic	swine	that	are	not	managed	with	intensive	
biosecurity	and	thus	are	likely	to	be	exposed	to	environmen-
tal	 elements	 and	 other	 domestic	 livestock,	 wildlife	 species,	
or	 their	 feral	 counterparts	 (52).	 Exposure	 to	 potential	 soft	
tick	 vectors	 and	other	blood	 feeding	 arthropods	 is	plausible	
depending	on	both	the	geographical	region	and	the	manage-
ment	 practice.	Given	 these	 conditions,	 an	ASF	 introduction	
into	 the	United	 States	may	put	 backyard	 farms	more	 at	 risk	
compared	 to	 commercial	 facilities,	 as	 has	 been	 reported	 in	
much	of	Eastern	Europe	and	some	European	Union	member	
states	(e.g.,	Latvia)	(43).
7Brown and Bevins Potential for the Introduction and Establishment of ASFV in the United States
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org February 2018 | Volume 5 | Article 11
DiAGNOSTiCS
Virus	isolation	can	be	used	for	the	diagnosis	of	ASF	as	live	virus	
can	be	obtained	from	live	animals	or	necropsy	tissues	although	
this	method	is	typically	only	used	in	reference	laboratories	to	con-
firm	diagnosis	(53).	The	spleen,	kidney,	tonsils,	and	lymph	nodes	
are	the	best	tissues	for	virus	collection.	Pig	leukocyte	cells,	bone	
marrow	 cultures,	 porcine	 alveolar	 macrophages,	 and	 porcine	
blood	monocytes	can	all	be	used	in	ASFV	culture.	Conventional	
and	 real-time	 PCR	 have	 been	 developed	 for	 the	 detection	 of	
ASFV,	and	multiple	primer	pairs	have	been	developed	to	create	
a	rapid	diagnostic	tool	(53–56).	A	strong	IgG	response	has	been	
detected	 in	 domestic	 swine	 that	 survive	 infection	 with	 ASFV	
(57).	As	 such,	 serological	 assays	 can	also	be	very	useful,	 espe-
cially	in	endemic	regions.	ELISA,	immunoblotting,	and	indirect	
fluorescent	 antibody	 assays	 are	 the	most	 common,	 and	ELISA	
followed	by	immunoblotting	is	often	used	for	international	trade	
purposes.
vACCiNeS
It	has	been	particularly	challenging	to	develop	an	effective	ASFV	
vaccine.	To	date,	no	vaccine	is	available	because	of	a	number	of	
key	factors,	including	the	lack	of	identification	of	protective	anti-
gens,	 incomplete	understanding	of	virus–host	cell	 interactions,	
and	inadequate	knowledge	relative	to	the	diversity	of	viral	strains	
currently	circulating	in	natural	reservoirs	(58,	59).	A	number	of	
vaccine	options	have	been	 tried	with	varying	 levels	of	 success,	
including	using	vaccines	with	naturally	or	experimentally	deleted	
genes,	subunit	vaccines	based	on	recombinant	proteins,	and	DNA	
vaccines	 (23).	 However,	 none	 conferred	 complete	 protection.	
A	 live	attenuated	vaccine	strain	was	developed	and	was	shown	
to	 provide	 protection	 against	 a	 homologous	 strain	 challenge;	
however,	use	on	the	Iberian	Peninsula	 is	believed	to	have	been	
the	origin	of	some	low	virulence	strains	that	induced	a	chronic	
disease	form	of	ASF	during	the	1960–1995	outbreak	(23).	Despite	
this	setback,	live	attenuated	vaccines	continue	to	be	evaluated	for	
their	protective	capacity	(60,	61).
Knockout	 ASFV	 mutants	 have	 been	 evaluated	 for	 efficacy	
although	 findings	 have	 been	 inconsistent.	 Afonso	 et  al.	 (62)	
describe	a	highly	conserved	gene,	referred	to	as	NL,	and	found	
that	 deletion	 of	 the	 gene	 from	 European	 pathogenic	 strains	
resulted	in	complete	attenuation	of	the	virus	in	domestic	swine.	
NL-deleted	mutants	were	created	for	two	highly	virulent	African	
strains	of	ASFV,	and	 inoculation	 in	domestic	 swine	 found	 that	
these	strains	retained	their	virulence,	irrespective	of	the	absence	
of	 NL.	 These	 findings	 suggest	 that	 NL	 gene	 function	 is	 not	
required	 for	 these	 strains	 of	 ASFV	 and	 that	NL	 gene	 deletion	
alone	 is	 insufficient	 to	engineer	 live	attenuated	ASFV	vaccines.	
Gene	9GL	is	highly	conserved,	and	in vitro	evaluation	determined	
that	the	protein	encoded	by	this	gene	affects	virion	maturation	
and	viral	growth	in	macrophage	culture	(63).	The	deletion	of	9GL	
resulted	 in	growth-defective	mutants	 in	culture	and	was	 found	
to	be	highly	attenuated	 in	domestic	 swine.	 Immunization	with	
a	9GL	knockout	virus	followed	by	a	challenge	with	a	wild-type	
ASFV	strain	resulted	in	complete	protection,	and	this	mutant	is	
being	further	evaluated	as	a	vaccine	candidate	for	ASFV.	The	9GL	
gene	is	also	highly	conserved	and	deletion	was	found	to	result	in	
complete	 viral	 attenuation	 in	 swine	 (64).	Vaccination	with	 the	
mutant	strain	followed	by	infection	with	a	wild-type	homologous	
virus	 resulted	 in	 complete	 protection.	 Interestingly,	 however,	
evaluation	of	anti-ASFV	specific	antibodies,	ASFV-specific	IFNγ	
response,	 and	circulating	 cytokine	 levels	 found	 that	 a	 complex	
immune	scenario	dictates	whether	infection	is	established.
Furthermore,	A238L	is	an	ASFV	immunomodulatory	protein	
that	inhibits	activation	of	the	NFĸB	and	NFAT	pathways,	which	
are	responsible	for	regulating	the	synthesis	of	pro-inflammatory	
cytokines	 (65).	This	 protein	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 a	 potent	 immu-
nosuppressor	 that	may	 contribute	 to	 viral	 evasion	 of	 the	 host	
immune	 response.	 Unsurprisingly,	 inoculation	 of	 pigs	 with	
A238L	 mutant	 viruses	 demonstrated	 an	 increase	 in	 TNFα,	 a	
potent	pro-inflammatory	cytokine.	Much	more	work	is	needed	
to	 determine	whether	 immunization	with	 viruses	 with	 altered	
immunomodulatory	 proteins	 could	 be	 harnessed	 to	 assist	 the	
host	immune	response	against	virulent	challenge.
Recombinant	 protein	 vaccines	 have	 also	 been	 characterized	
using	 a	 number	 of	 relevant	 viral	 proteins.	 p30	 and	 p54	 are	
externally	 located	 and	 involved	 in	 virus	 attachment	 and	 virus	
internalization,	respectively	(58).	Immunization	of	domestic	pigs	
with	either	recombinant	p54	or	p30	proteins	induced	neutralizing	
antibodies,	but	did	not	protect	against	 lethal	challenge	and	the	
disease	 course	 was	 unaltered.	 Combination	 p54	 and	 p30	 vac-
cines	 produced	 both	 neutralizing	 antibodies	 and	modified	 the	
disease	course	resulting	in	a	range	of	protection.	Ivanov	et al.	(66)	
evaluated	46	peptides	that	mimic	viral	proteins	for	their	ability	to	
establish	a	protective	immune	response.	Vaccination	with	some	
combinations	of	these	peptides	was	found	to	delay	mortality	in	
domestic	swine	and	warrants	further	investigation.	A	baculovirus	
vector	 expressing	 the	ASFV	hemagglutinin	was	 used	 as	 a	 vac-
cine,	and	all	pigs	 survived	challenge	with	a	virulent	virus	after	
immunization	(67).
DNA	vaccines	have	also	been	assessed	as	an	option	for	ASF,	
and	partial	protection	was	afforded	in	domestic	swine	using	p54	
and	p30	as	antigens	on	the	construct	(68).	The	robust	activation	
of	CD8+	cells	appears	to	be	extremely	important	for	protection.
Exposure	 to	 a	 non-virulent	 strain	 in	 Portugal	 (OURT88/3	
genotype	1)	followed	by	a	virulent	strain	(OURT88/1	genotype	1)	
conferred	protection	against	challenge	with	virulent	field	isolates	
from	Africa	(69).	This	immunization	strategy	protected	most	pigs	
from	both	disease	development	and	viremia.	The	cross-reactivity	
of	 the	 various	 strains	 of	 ASFV	 can	 be	 measured	 using	 IFNγ	
stimulatory	assays	and	provide	a	strong	correlation	to	the	degree	
of	protection	conferred.
In	 addition	 to	 evaluating	 new	 vaccine	 preparations,	 Blome	
et al.	(70)	reassessed	inactivated	ASFV	vaccination	preparations	
using	modern	adjuvants,	specifically	Polygen	and	Emulsigen	D,	
which	are	known	to	stimulate	both	humoral	and	cellular	immune	
responses,	including	IFNγ.	The	efficacy	of	inactivated	ASFV	vac-
cines	was	not	 improved,	 and	no	protection	was	observed	 after	
vaccination	followed	by	challenge	with	a	homologous	strain.	In	
fact,	vaccinated	animals	submitted	to	the	disease	more	quickly,	
suggesting	the	possibility	of	antibody	dependent	enhancement.
Vaccine	 development	 for	ASFV	 is	 ongoing	 and	 challenging	
due	 to	 the	 range	of	 genetic	 and	 antigenic	 variability	 as	well	 as	
TABLe 1 | Number and purpose of pigs that were imported into the United 
States from Canada between years 2012 and 2016.
Purpose Number of animals imported
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Breeding 
swine
155,417 196,320 249,214 234,796 150,267
Feeding 
swine
4,706,866 4,177,805 3,936,987 4,314,664 4,626,477
Direct to 
slaughter
886,736 824,511 851,002 1,163,884 980,242
Total 5,749,019 5,198,636 5,037,203 5,713,344 5,756,986
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the	myriad	of	strategies	utilized	by	the	virus	to	evade	the	host’s	
immune	response.	Further	work	is	essential	to	develop	a	vaccine	
that	 is	 both	 biosafe	 and	 provides	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 protection	
across	 virulent	 ASFV	 strains.	 Subject	 matter	 experts	 believe	
that	live	attenuated	vaccines	are	the	most	promising	candidates	
in	the	short	term	due	to	their	experimental	successes;	however,	
more	studies	are	required	to	confirm	vaccine	safety,	capacity	to	
differentiate	between	naturally	 infected	and	vaccinated	animals	
(DIVA),	and	long-term	efficacy	(60).
ASF AND THe UNiTeD STATeS
The	introduction	of	ASFV	into	the	United	States	could	negatively	
affect	 the	 domestic	 swine	 industry	 because	 of	 morbidity	 and	
mortality,	the	associated	losses	in	production,	and	restrictions	on	
interstate	and	 international	 trade.	The	Foreign	Animal	Disease	
Preparedness	and	Response	Plan	(FAD	PReP),	Disease	Response	
Strategy:	 African	 Swine	 Fever	 put	 together	 by	 USDA	 APHIS	
Veterinary	 Services	 (71)	 provides	 information	 relevant	 to	 all	
aspects	 of	 a	 disease	 response	 in	 the	United	 States	 in	 the	 event	
of	 a	 viral	 incursion.	The	 control	 and	 eradication	 strategies	 are	
based	 on	 four	 epidemiological	 principles:	 (1)	 prevent	 contact	
between	ASFV	and	susceptible	animals	(primarily	via	quarantine	
and	restricted	movement),	(2)	stop	the	production	of	ASFV	by	
infected	and/or	 exposed	animals,	 (3)	 stop	vector	 transmission,	
and	(4)	increase	the	disease	resistance	of	susceptible	animals	to	
ASFV.	However,	the	primary	control	and	eradication	strategy	are	
predicated	on	stamping	out	(depopulation	of	clinically	affected	
and	 in-contact	 control	 susceptible	 swine).	 Currently,	 there	 is	
no	active	surveillance	being	conducted	in	the	United	States	for	
ASF.	 The	 USDA	 FAD	 Prep	 Document	 provides	 information	
for	responders	and	stakeholders	 such	 that	 they	understand	 the	
disease	agent.	Furthermore,	a	stochastic	risk	assessment	model	
created	 by	Herrera-Ibata	 et  al.	 (72)	 determined	 the	months	 of	
highest	risk,	the	origin	of	the	imports	of	higher	risk,	and	the	US	
states	most	vulnerable	to	an	ASF	introduction.	This	information	
can	 be	 used	 to	 optimize	 surveillance	 plans	 and	 develop	 emer-
gency	response	protocols	to	help	reduce	the	impact	of	a	potential	
ASF	introduction	into	the	United	States.
SUMMARY OF UNiTeD STATeS 
vULNeRABiLiTieS FOR THe 
iNTRODUCTiON OR PeRSiSTeNCe  
OF ASFv
Risk of introduction into the United States
Vergne	et al.	(73)	evaluate	the	pathways	for	the	potential	intro-
duction	of	ASF	in	China,	which	maintains	over	half	of	the	global	
pig	population,	and	our	risk	assessment	shows	similar	routes	of	
concern	 for	virus	 introduction.	The	 legal	or	 illegal	movement	
of	live	animals	or	their	products,	byproducts,	or	animal	feed,	or	
an	intentional	viral	release	in	an	act	of	bioterrorism	comprise	
the	 routes	of	highest	concern	 for	ASFV	 introduction	 into	 the	
United	States.	It	is	important	to	note	that	to	result	in	an	outbreak	
event,	an	imported	ASFV	would	need	to	be	released	into	a	sus-
ceptible	 population.	An	 initial	 outbreak	 event	 could	occur	 in	
domestic	or	feral	swine	and	then	presumably	spillover	into	the	
other	population.	Each	of	these	possible	routes	of	introduction	
is	described.
Legal Movement of Live Animals
Domestic	swine	are	imported	annually	from	Canada,	and	Table 1	
summarizes	the	number	of	animals	imported	and	their	purpose.	
Currently,	Canada	is	ASFV	free	and,	as	such,	the	importation	of	
suids	is	unlikely	to	result	in	an	ASFV	introduction	into	the	United	
States.
Legal Movement of Animal Products, Byproducts, 
and Animal Feed
Animal	products	and	byproducts	as	well	as	animal	feed	that	are	
imported	into	the	United	States	all	require	permits	upon	entry.	
Products	 and	 byproducts	 that	 are	 coming	 from	ASF-endemic	
regions	must	be	treated	in	a	manner	that	has	previously	dem-
onstrated	efficacy	in	destroying	ASFV,	typically	involving	heat,	
pH,	 or	 fixation	 processes.	 Products	 and	 byproducts	 derived	
from	 ASF-free	 countries	 can	 be	 imported	 in	 an	 unprocessed	
form.	Animal	feed	from	ASF-endemic	regions	is	required	to	be	
cooked	 to	 a	 specific	 temperature	 and	 for	 a	 specified	 duration	
before	importation.	Products	coming	from	the	European	Union,	
which	is	designated	as	a	low-risk	region,	can	be	imported	raw	if	
desired;	however,	documentation	is	required	to	certify	that	the	
product	 is	coming	from	an	unaffected	herd	in	an	unrestricted	
region.
Illegal Movement of Live Animals and Their Products
The	US	Department	of	Homeland	Security	Customs	and	Border	
Protection	 (CBP)	 is	 primarily	 responsible	 for	 the	 confiscation	
of	 illegally	 imported	 products	 and	 specimens	 from	 domestic	
livestock	 species.	 Data	 provided	 by	 CBP	 depict	 products	 and	
specimens	 from	 domestic	 swine	 that	 were	 confiscated	 in	 the	
cargo	 or	 express	 courier	 environment,	which	 includes	 compa-
nies	such	as	FedEx	and	DHL,	or	via	international	mail	facilities,	
including	US	 postal	 service.	 Between	 calendar	 years	 2012	 and	
2016,	over	68,000	products	and	specimens	derived	from	domestic	
swine	were	confiscated	by	CBP.	The	continents	of	origin	for	the	
majority	of	products	and	specimens	confiscated	by	CBP	are	Asia	
and	Europe,	which	 comprise	 49	 and	 44%	of	 the	 confiscations,	
respectively.	 South	 America,	 Australia,	 Africa,	 and	 unknown	
account	for	≤1%	each,	and	products	and	specimens	confiscated	
FiGURe 2 | A pie chart depicting the continent of origin for the products confiscated by US Customs and Border Protection between 2012 and 2016 (n = 68,594).
9
Brown and Bevins Potential for the Introduction and Establishment of ASFV in the United States
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org February 2018 | Volume 5 | Article 11
from	North	America	comprise	5%.	These	data	are	summarized	
in	Figure 2.
A	 large	 number	 of	 products	 and	 specimens	 were	 derived	
from	continents	with	regions	that	are	enzootic	for	ASF.	The	exact	
number	of	products	and	specimens	that	are	smuggled	across	the	
US	border	is	difficult	to	ascertain,	and	it	can	be	assumed	that	the	
products	and/or	specimens	discovered	represent	a	small	subset	
of	the	types	of	goods	that	are	illegally	imported	into	the	United	
States.	Due	to	the	types	of	products	confiscated	and	the	regions	
of	the	world	from	which	they	originate,	the	illegal	importation	of	
domestic	livestock	products	and	specimens	certainly	pose	a	risk	
for	ASF	introduction.
The	US	Fish	and	Wildlife	Service	(FWS)	is	responsible	for	the	
confiscation	of	illegally	imported	wildlife;	however,	a	1994	report	
from	the	Government	Accountability	Office	estimated	that	1–3%	
of	 illegal	wildlife	 shipments	 carried	 by	 passengers,	 and	 1–10%	
of	 illegally	 imported	 wildlife	 in	 declared	 cargo	 shipments	 are	
detected	(74).	This	problem	is	believed	to	be	primarily	a	result	
of	 a	 limited	 inspection	 workforce	 and	 budgetary	 restrictions	
on	overtime,	such	that	ports	of	entry	are	often	without	inspec-
tor	 coverage.	 FWS	provided	 data	 relative	 to	wild	 suid	 product	
confiscations	 in	 the	United	States	between	2006	and	2016.	The	
types	of	wild	suids	from	which	products	were	illegally	imported	
and	subsequently	confiscated	by	US	FWS	agents	can	be	found	in	
Figure 3.	Warthog	products	are	responsible	for	more	than	60%	of	
confiscations	followed	by	wild	boar,	bush	pigs,	unspecified	swine	
products,	and	babirusa;	however,	the	sample	size	is	small	because	
of	the	specific	nature	of	the	data	(wild	suids)	and	because	not	all	
illegal	imports	are	likely	detected.
The	majority	of	products	seized	by	FWS	in	the	United	States	
were	those	that	originated	on	the	continent	of	Africa	(Figure 4).	
Approximately	 25%	 of	 confiscations	 were	 of	 products	 derived	
from	North	and	South	America	as	well	as	unknown	countries	of	
origin.	Asia,	Australia,	and	Europe	comprised	13%	of	confisca-
tions.	A	large	proportion	of	all	confiscated	products	were	derived	
from	 continents,	 which	 are	 endemic	 for	ASFV	 (or	 unknown);	
hence,	illegal	animal/animal	product	transport	presents	a	risk	for	
ASFV	introduction.
Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism	 is	described	as	 the	 intentional	 release	or	disse	mi-
nation	 of	 bacteria,	 viruses,	 or	 toxins	 that	 cause	 morbidity	 or	
mortality	events	in	humans,	other	animals,	or	plants.	Due	to	the	
tremendous	value	of	the	domestic	swine	industry	in	the	United	
States,	 the	high	morbidity	and	mortality	associated	with	 infec-
tion,	the	ease	of	viral	spread	due	to	the	endemic	status	of	many	
countries	globally,	the	stability	of	the	virus	in	chilled	and	frozen	
products,	the	safety	for	the	individual(s)	involved	in	the	release	as	
the	pathogen	is	not	zoonotic,	and	the	crippling	economic	effects	
attendant	with	an	introduction,	ASFV	is	a	potential	candidate	to	
be	released	in	an	act	of	bioterrorism.	This	route	of	introduction	
is	difficult	to	prevent	and	as	such	spotlights	the	need	for	robust	
surveillance	systems	in	both	domestic	and	feral	swine	to	ensure	
rapid	detection	and	differential	diagnosis.
Factors that Complicate eradication 
efforts following introduction
The	 risk	 of	 ASFV	 introduction	 to	 the	 United	 States	 is	 low	
(72).	 Following	 a	 potential	 introduction,	 however,	 ASFV	
establishment,	 even	 short-term	 establishment,	 is	 an	 open	
question.	ASF	has	never	been	found	in	the	United	States,	but	
FiGURe 4 | Number of wild suid specimens seized by the US Fish and Wildlife Service between 2006 and 2016 based on continent of origin (n = 133).
FiGURe 3 | Types of suids from which products were confiscated by the US Fish and Wildlife Services between 2006 and 2016 (n = 133).
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it	has	successfully	taken	hold	in	areas	of	introduction	around	
the	world.	Transmission	cycles	 and	viral	 ecology	often	differ	
in	 different	 locations,	 demonstrating	 at	 least	 some	flexibility	
for	the	virus	to	persist	in	a	range	of	climates,	with	or	without	
tick	 vector	 involvement,	 and	 with	 or	 without	 a	 wild	 suid	
component	(75).	Climate	would	not	limit	ASFV	establishment	
in	 the	 United	 States,	 and	 there	 are	 tick	 species	 that	 could	
potentially	play	a	role	in	viral	maintenance	(76).	The	presence	
of	backyard	swine	and	feral	swine	could	also	aid	in	short-term	
establishment	 similar	 to	what	 has	 been	 seen	 elsewhere	 (43).	
The	 biosecure	 nature	 of	 the	 US	 commercial	 swine	 industry	
would	likely	detect	and	limit	ASF	transmission	without	long-
term	establishment,	but	economic	consequences	could	still	be	
significant.
Feral	 swine,	 which	 are	 found	 in	 a	 large	 number	 of	 states,	
present	 a	 risk	 because	 of	 their	 free-roaming	 behavior	 and	
FiGURe 5 | Counties highlighted in blue within each state of the United States where feral swine have been found. (Figure courtesy by APHIS National Feral Swine 
Damage Management Program.)
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omnivorous	diets	and,	 in	 the	event	of	a	viral	 incursion,	would	
likely	 contribute	 to	 amplification	 and	 transmission	 events	 to	
other	feral	swine	or	their	domestic	counterparts.	Soft	tick	species	
in	the	Ornithodoros	genus	that	are	native	to	the	United	States	also	
present	an	element	of	complexity	as	their	competence	in	a	field	
setting	remains	largely	unknown	but	could	substantially	compli-
cate	viral	persistence	and	disease	eradication.	These	elements	are	
described	in	detail	below.
Feral Swine
The	OIE	 defines	 feral	 animals	 as	 those	 that	 do	 not	 live	 under	
human	 supervision	 or	 control	 but	 have	 a	 phenotype	 that	 was	
selected	by	humans	(77).	Feral	swine	(Sus scrofa)	include	released	
and	escaped	domestic	swine,	truly	wild	Eurasian	boars,	and	their	
hybrids	and	are	believed	to	have	been	originally	brought	to	the	
United	States	in	the	1400s	(78).	APHIS	experts	estimate	that	over	
6	million	feral	swine	roam	within	at	least	35	states	in	the	United	
States	with	California,	Florida,	Oklahoma,	and	Texas	having	the	
largest	populations	(Figure 5).	In	addition	to	being	an	invasive	
species,	feral	swine	can	damage	the	environment	and	agricultural	
operations;	alter	ecosystems	with	their	rooting	behavior	that	can	
be	detrimental	to	threatened	and	endangered	species;	and	pose	
a	health	threat	to	humans,	domestic	livestock,	wildlife,	and	com-
panion	animals	as	a	result	of	the	type	of	pathogens	that	they	are	
capable	of	carrying	and	transmitting	(79,	80).	Studies	involving	
global	 positioning	 system	 (GPS)	 collared	 feral	 swine	 demon-
strated	 that	 they	 contacted	domestic	 swine,	 and	digital	 images	
indicated	 that	 feral	 swine	 attempted	 to	 enter	 pens	 containing	
domestic	female	pigs	(52).	These	types	of	interactions,	which	are	
unsurprising	because	of	the	gregarious	nature	of	both	domestic	
pigs	and	feral	swine,	increase	the	risk	of	pathogen	transmission	
events	(81).
Typically	 male	 feral	 swine	 live	 a	 solitary	 life,	 while	 repro-
ductively	active	 females	 live	 in	small	groups	with	 their	young,	
referred	 to	 as	 sounders.	 Contact	 rates	 within	 and	 between	
sounders	have	been	studied	using	GPS	devices,	and	not	surpris-
ingly,	 contact	 rates	 are	much	higher	 amongst	members	 of	 the	
same	sounder	compared	to	those	between	animals	of	different	
sounders	(82).	However,	it	has	further	been	shown	that	sounder	
home	ranges	often	overlap	extensively	(83).	Sounder	interaction	
is	reduced	when	sounders	are	separated	at	distances	>2 km,	and	
as	such,	disease	transmission	is	expected	to	be	reduced	between	
sounders	at	this	distance	and	nearly	negligible	between	sounders	
separated	by	>6 km.	Based	on	these	data,	the	quarantine	radius	
surrounding	 a	 positive	 premise	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 at	 least	 2  km,	
although	feral	swine	activity	would	be	but	one	factor	to	consider	
when	determining	quarantine	size.	Certainly,	other	factors	may	
exist	that	lead	to	clustering,	such	as	water	availability	or	baiting	
activities,	among	others.	Lone	boars	have	been	shown	to	have	
much	 larger	 home	 ranges	 compared	 to	 sounders	 and	 are	 far	
more	 likely	 to	 move	 great	 distances	 (84).	 Furthermore,	 feral	
swine	densities	should	also	be	accounted	for	as	movement	may	
be	influenced	by	density.
Bait	stations	have	been	considered	as	an	alternative	to	fencing	
for	containing	feral	pigs	during	culling	activities;	however,	once	
evaluated	empirically,	it	was	found	that	baiting	is	not	a	suitable	
alternative	as	only	62%	of	feral	swine	trapped	within	proximity	
of	 the	bait	 station	used	 it	 (85).	Baiting	 can	be	 effectively	used	
to	describe	patterns	of	swine	movement,	facilitate	observations,	
and	 improve	 the	 outcome	 of	 removal	 programs.	 Interestingly,	
culling	 activities	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 greatly	 impact	 feral	 swine	
movements.
In	 the	 event	 of	 a	 disease	outbreak	 that	 affects	 swine	 (either	
exclusively	or	in	conjunction	with	other	livestock	species),	feral	
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swine	 could	 be	 problematic.	 Fencing	 types	 that	 can	 effectively	
contain	 feral	 swine	 have	 been	 evaluated,	 and	 hog	 panels	 have	
been	 found	 to	be	highly	effective	 (86).	These	panels	have	been	
found	to	be	effective	even	when	feral	swine	motivation	to	escape	
is	 increased	 due	 to	 human	 intervention.	 In	 addition,	 they	 are	
relatively	 quick	 and	 cheap	 to	 erect—both	 of	which	 are	 crucial	
components	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 disease	 outbreak.	While	 fencing	
shows	promise,	it	is	an	option	typically	reserved	for	a	small,	local-
ized	scale,	such	as	the	area	surrounding	a	single	positive	farm.
Knowledge	 derived	 from	 ecological	 and	 behavioral	 experi-
ments	 would	 be	 employed,	 and	 information	 specific	 to	 the	
infected	premise	would	be	utilized	 to	make	an	 informed	deci-
sion	 regarding	 the	 frequency	 and	nature	 of	 visitation	between	
domestic	 livestock	and	 feral	 swine.	This	 information	would	be	
used	 in	 conjunction	 with	 data	 on	 other	 factors	 such	 as	 other	
nutrient	accessibility	and	feral	swine	densities	(if	density	data	are	
available)	 to	determine	 the	appropriate	 spatial	 scale	of	 fencing	
or	surveillance.	Feral	swine	home	ranges	can	vary	dramatically	
based	 on	 the	 habitat	 complexity	 and	 the	 availability	 of	 food,	
water,	and	shelter.	For	example,	a	study	on	feral	swine	movement	
in	multiple	regions	of	Texas	found	that	the	area	used	by	GPS	col-
lared	individuals	could	range	from	4.5	to	22.23 km2	depending	on	
location	and	season	(87).	Fencing	has	been	successfully	used	on	
large	scales	to	exclude	feral	swine	from	a	national	park	in	Hawaii	
[>75  km	 (88)]	 and	 from	 a	 national	 monument	 in	 California	
[42 km	(89)],	although	these	were	erected	over	a	time	frame	that	
was	longer	than	required	for	a	typical	outbreak	situation.	Fencing	
can	also	be	used	to	control	movement.	It	is	likely	that	a	perimeter	
fence	 would	 be	 erected	 around	 the	 infected	 premise	 with	 the	
aim	 to	 enclose	 all	 feral	 swine	 that	may	have	direct	or	 indirect	
contact	with	animals	from	the	infected	premise	before	targeted	
removal	 of	 all	 feral	 swine	 within	 the	 fenced	 region.	 Culling	
activities	would	likely	be	initiated	immediately	in	an	attempt	to	
contain	disease	transmission.	Sounders	and	lone	boars	that	live	
outside,	but	near,	the	quarantine	region	would	likely	be	closely	
monitored	to	evaluate	disease	transmission	and	may	be	subject	
to	prophylactic	culling.	Outbreak	specific	characteristics	would	
be	 important	 to	 include,	 such	 as	 the	 amount	 of	 time	 that	 has	
elapsed	since	the	first	case,	the	virulence	of	the	ASFV	strain,	and	
the	density	of	both	domestic	and	feral	swine,	among	many	other	
components.
An	ecological	model	developed	in	Europe	showed	that	conven-
tional	wild	boar	management	approaches	such	as	banning	feed-
ing	and	targeted	hunting	of	reproductively	active	females	became	
slowly	effective	over	multiple	generations	(90).	As	such,	a	buffer	of	
100–200 km	was	necessary	to	compensate	for	the	forward	spread	
of	disease	until	the	measures	became	effective.	However,	massive	
population	destruction	(>80%	of	 the	population	in	the	control	
region	within	4 months)	or	immediate	removal	of	infectious	car-
casses	reduced	the	buffer	zone	to	<50 km.	A	hybrid	approach	of	
the	control	methods	would	result	in	an	intermediate	buffer	zone	
width.	Of	note,	 hunting	 as	 a	means	 to	 control	 population	 and	
reduce	the	spread	of	ASF	is	very	effective,	but	all	efforts	should	
be	made	to	reduce	dispersal	during	this	period	as	the	gains	made	
in	ASF	control	via	population	reduction	can	be	quickly	offset	by	
wild	boar	movement	and	subsequent	introduction	of	ASFV	into	
naive	populations	(42).
Controlling	 and/or	 eradicating	disease	outbreaks	 in	 feral	or	
wild	populations	is	extremely	difficult	for	a	number	of	reasons.	
Informed	decision-making	in	the	absence	of	knowledge	or	facts	
is	often	required	in	these	types	of	settings,	and	as	such	a	systems	
approach	can	be	used	to	inform	resource	allocation	and	a	system-
atic	perspective	(91).	The	publication	by	Delgado	et al.	(91)	was	
written	with	classical	swine	fever	(CSF)	in	mind;	however,	many	
of	the	components	would	likely	be	similar	for	ASF.
The	United	States	is	neighbored	by	two	other	countries,	and	
feral	swine	populations	move	back	and	forth	between	countries	
on	both	the	northern	and	southern	borders.	For	example,	it	is	not	
known	if	a	detailed	census	of	feral	swine	populations	throughout	
Mexico	has	been	done,	but	there	are	populations	along	the	United	
States–Mexico	 border	 that	 are	 contiguous	 with	 the	 US	 feral	
swine	population.	Figure 6	shows	the	distribution	of	feral	swine	
in	Mexico	based	on	the	subjective	reports	 from	the	agriculture	
department	 of	 each	 municipality.	 Feral	 swine	 have	 been	 seen	
moving	back	and	forth	across	the	border	along	some	stretches,	
depending	on	the	landscape.	While	both	Mexico	and	Canada	are	
considered	ASFV	free,	it	still	presents	a	concern	that	the	borders	
are	 porous	 allowing	 for	movement	 of	 feral	 swine	 between	 the	
countries	along	both	borders.	In	the	event	of	viral	incursion	in	
the	United	 States,	Mexico,	 or	 Canada	 that	 spills	 over	 into	 the	
feral	 swine	 population,	 this	movement	 will	 present	 challenges	
related	to	disease	control	and	eradication.	Semiquantitative	risk	
assessments	 have	 been	 developed	 to	 evaluate	 the	 risk	 of	 ASF	
introduction	into	the	EU	by	wild	boar	movements	as	ASF	is	now	
considered	endemic	in	much	of	Eastern	Europe	(92).	In	the	event	
of	an	ASFV	introduction	in	either	Canada	or	Mexico,	this	type	
of	modeling	approach	could	be	used	to	evaluate	the	risk	of	virus	
introduction	into	the	United	States	by	feral	swine.
Ornithodoros Ticks in North America
Tick	 families	 of	 veterinary	 and	 medical	 importance	 include	
the	 Ixodidae,	 which	 are	 commonly	 known	 as	 hard	 ticks,	 and	
Argasidae,	which	are	commonly	referred	to	as	soft	ticks.	Several	
soft	 tick	 species	 in	 the	 genus	Ornithodoros	 are	 known	 vectors	
of	ASFV,	 and	have	 a	 nidiculous	 lifestyle,	which	 indicates	 their	
preference	to	reside	in	the	nest	or	burrow	inhabited	by	their	ver-
tebrate	hosts	(93,	94).	Their	lifecycle	involves	immature	and	adult	
male	and	female	stages	that	take	short,	repeated	blood	meals	(95).	
Mated	female	soft	ticks	use	the	blood	meal	to	produce	eggs	that	
are	 laid	 in	 a	 suitable	habitat.	Adult	Ornithodoros	 ticks	 can	 live	
for	several	years	without	feeding,	and	their	distribution	tends	to	
overlap	the	geographic	range	of	their	hosts	(76).
Five	 species	 of	Ornithodoros	 ticks	 are	 found	 in	 the	 United	
States.	O. coriaceus, Ornithodoros hermsi,	 and	O. parkeri	 occur	
in	the	western	and	Midwestern	regions	of	the	United	States	and	
O. turicata	and	Ornithodoros talaje	are	found	in	the	arid	regions	
of	the	southern	United	States	(10,	96).	Laboratory	investigations	
reviewed	 by	 Kleiboeker	 and	 Scoles	 (33)	 demonstrated	 that	
O. coriaceus, O. parkeri,	and	O. turicata	were	capable	of	becoming	
infected	with	ASFV	and	O. coriaceus	was	competent	in	transmit-
ting	 the	 virus	 to	 naive	 domestic	 swine.	 Of	 particular	 concern	
is	O. turicata,	 found	 in	Arizona,	California,	Colorado,	Florida,	
Kansas,	New	Mexico,	Oklahoma,	Texas,	and	Utah.	These	states	
also	 provide	 suitable	 habitat	 for	 large	 numbers	 of	 feral	 swine,	
FiGURe 6 | Geographical distribution of feral swine in Mexico (2012): red = high density (>2,000 pigs/county), orange = moderate density (500–2,000 pigs/county), 
and yellow = low density (<500 pigs/county). (Figure courtesy by APHIS National Feral Swine Damage Management Program.)
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which	presents	an	opportunity	for	the	maintenance	of	ASFV	by	
O. turicata	in	the	event	of	a	viral	incursion	with	the	involvement	
of	feral	swine	(97).
Because	of	 their	 short-feeding	duration	and	nidiculous	 life-
style,	the	global	distributions	of	soft	ticks	can	be	challenging	to	
determine;	however,	their	capacity	to	transmit	pathogens	makes	
this	 information	 of	 the	 utmost	 importance.	 A	 regional	model	
using	spatial	multicriteria	decision	analysis	to	identify	geographi-
cal	areas	that	are	suitable	for	specific	species	of	Ornithodoros spp.	
was	created	by	Vial	et al.	(98).	This	model	was	developed	for	the	
Western	Palearctic	region;	although	in	the	event	of	ASFV	intro-
duction	into	the	United	States,	this	methodology	could	be	applied	
to	native	Ornithodoros	ticks	to	determine	species	and	regions	of	
concern.
In	addition	to	the	competent	Ornithodoros	species	found	in	
the	United	States,	O. puertoricensis	is	found	in	the	Caribbean,	
specifically	 Jamaica,	 Haiti,	 the	 Dominican	 Republic,	 and	 in	
Panama	(99)	and	can	be	infected	with,	and	transmit,	ASFV	to	
susceptible	domestic	 swine	 (33).	The	porous	border	between	
the	 United	 States	 and	 Mexico	 provides	 further	 complexity	
in	 the	 event	 of	 an	 introduction	 of	 ASFV	 in	 either	 country,	
and	 soft	 tick	 vectors	 could	play	 a	 role	 as	 an	 epidemiological	
bridge	as	they	might	be	transported	to	disease-free	regions.	It	
is	 important	 to	note	 that	 although	 soft	 ticks	 engorge	 rapidly	
and	tend	to	drop	off	their	host	after	completion	of	 the	blood	
meal,	reports	of	host	infestation	as	“stowaways,”	including	feral	
swine,	captured	outside	of	 their	nest	or	burrow	has	occurred	
(100,	 101).	 Thus,	 this	 potential	 route	 of	 viral	 introduction	
or	 spread	 is	 worth	mentioning.	 Furthermore,	 they	 are	 often	
promiscuous	 in	 their	 host	 preferences	 and	have	occasionally	
been	recovered	from	birds,	which	also	pose	a	risk	for	disease	
translocation	(10).
CONCLUDiNG ReMARKS
African	 swine	 fever	 virus	 introduction	 (either	 accidental	 or	
purposeful)	 to	 the	United	 States	 could	 cause	 severe	morbidity	
and	mortality	in	domestic	swine.	Furthermore,	the	trade	implica-
tions	associated	with	ASFV	in	domestic	swine	are	substantial	and	
could	 severely	 affect	 the	pork	 industry.	The	current	 regulatory	
systems	 in	 place	 for	 the	 importation	 of	 live	 animals,	 animal	
products,	 byproducts,	 and	 feed	 are	 comprehensive,	 involving	
considerable	 Federal	 oversight	 and	 encompassing	 information	
relevant	 to	 the	 country	 of	 origin,	 the	 product	 to	 be	 imported,	
and	the	species	involved	must	conform	to	research	methods	that	
effectively	 demonstrate	 the	 deactivation	 of	 ASFV.	 Despite	 the	
robust	regulatory	framework,	the	illegal	importation	of	animals	
and	their	products	is	in	its	very	nature	difficult	to	control,	manage,	
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or	regulate.	Semiquantitative	approaches	can	be	used	to	evaluate	
the	 risk	 of	 disease	 introduction	 via	 the	 illegal	 importation	 of	
pork	and	pork	products,	and	modeling	in	the	European	Union	
suggests	 that	 this	 channel	 certainly	 serves	 as	 a	 risk	 for	 ASFV	
importation	and	subsequent	introduction	(102).	Bioterrorism	is	
another	potential	route	of	introduction.	Given	the	complexities	of	
preventing	accidental	or	purposeful	ASFV	introduction	into	the	
United	States,	vigilant	observance	of	domestic	livestock	and	rapid	
reporting	and	differential	diagnosis	are	necessary	in	the	event	of	a	
disease	detection	in	pigs.	Channels	for	rapid	communication	and	
diagnostics	already	exist	through	state	and	national	veterinarians	
and	laboratories	as	evidenced	by	a	pilot	study	in	which	samples	
were	collected	from	culled	feral	swine	and	evaluated	for	the	pres-
ence	of	ASFV.	The	evaluation	of	samples	for	ASFV	suggests	that	
labs	 are	 proficient	 in	 diagnostic	 techniques	 necessary	 for	 viral	
detection.
African	 swine	 fever	 virus	 introduction,	 or	 spillover,	 into	
feral	 swine	populations	would	heavily	 complicate	 eradication.	
Furthermore,	unrestricted	movement	of	feral	swine	across	porous	
borders	presents	a	challenge	in	the	event	of	an	ASFV	incursion	
into	any	countries	that	share	borders.	The	presence	of	competent	
biological	 vectors,	Ornithodoros	 ticks,	 further	 complicates	 the	
control	 and	 eradication	of	ASFV	upon	 introduction	 to	 a	new	
region.	These	ticks	are	often	long	lived	and	are	believed	to	play	
an	important	role	in	viral	maintenance	and	may	contribute	to	
the	development	of	endemicity	in	a	specific	region.	O. coriaceus,	
O. parkeri,	and	O. turicata	are	present	in	the	United	States	and	
have	been	found	to	be	capable	of	ASFV	infection	and	in	the	case	
of	O. coriaceus,	ticks	are	capable	of	transmitting	the	virus	to	sus-
ceptible	swine	(33,	96).	Ornithodoros dugesi	are	found	in	Texas	
and	northern	Mexico,	and	O. talaje	are	found	in	the	southern	
United	States;	however,	neither	species	has	been	evaluated	for	its	
competence	as	a	biological	vector	for	ASFV.	Further	laboratory	
studies	should	be	designed	to	evaluate	the	ability	for	O. dugesi	
and	O. talaje	to	become	infected	with	various	strains	of	ASFV	and	
to	characterize	the	ability	for	O. parkeri	and	O. turicata	as	well	as	
O. dugesi	 and	 O. talaje,	 pending	 their	 capacity	 to	 become	
infected,	 to	 transmit	 infection	 to	 susceptible	 domestic	 swine.	
In	 addition,	 expanded	 analyses	 to	 explore	 the	 distribution	 of	
competent	Ornithodoros	 ticks	in	relation	to	dense	commercial	
pig	 production	 regions	 as	 well	 as	 high	 populations	 of	 feral	
swine	are	needed.	Moreover,	determining	host	preferences	for	
competent	vector	species	is	important	to	characterize	risk.	The	
lack	of	a	vaccine	for	ASFV	makes	disease	control	and	eradica-
tion	substantially	more	difficult,	and	as	such,	efficacious	vaccine	
development	 is	 a	 high	 priority.	 Characterization	 of	 antigenic	
viral	proteins	that	contribute	to	a	host	immune	response	and	a	
determination	of	 immune	mechanisms	that	 lead	to	protection	
are	 extremely	 important	 and	 foundational	 for	 the	 quest	 of	 a	
vaccine.
Currently,	the	United	States	does	not	have	any	active	surveil-
lance	protocols	 for	ASF	 in	domestic	or	 feral	 swine.	The	risk	of	
introduction	is	believed	to	be	low	because	the	disease	is	not	cur-
rently	present	in	the	western	hemisphere.	In	addition,	the	intro-
duction	of	ASFV	into	a	naive	population	is	typically	accompanied	
by	 severe	mortality	 such	 that	 passive	 surveillance,	 sampling	of	
dead	pigs,	would	likely	be	sufficient	to	detect	an	ASFV	incursion	
(103,	104).	Importantly,	during	calendar	year	2017,	the	Foreign	
Animal	Disease	Diagnostic	Laboratory	(FADDL)	at	Plum	Island	
Animal	 Disease	 Center	 performed	 only	 two	 cases	 requesting	
ASF	testing	and	both	were	negative	(Personal	communication).	
Of	note,	however,	a	stochastic	model	used	to	evaluate	transmis-
sion	of	ASFV	within	a	population	found	that	 the	virus	may	be	
circulating	in	a	herd	for	several	weeks	before	a	marked	increase	
in	mortality	is	observed,	which	limits	the	usefulness	of	mortality	
data	as	a	means	of	early	detection	in	an	outbreak	scenario	(105).	It	
may	also	be	useful	to	compare	the	conditions	in	the	United	States	
to	those	in	Europe	to	determine	whether	the	buffer	zones	neces-
sary	to	quell	an	ASF	outbreak	in	Europe	(90)	would	be	similar	to	
those	required	for	an	outbreak	in	the	United	States.
USDA	Veterinary	Services	have	outlined	a	surveillance	pro-
gram	 for	 CSFV	 in	 domestic	 swine	 that	 could	 be	 harnessed	 to	
evaluate	ASFV	 in	 the	 event	 the	 risk	 of	 introduction	 increases.	
The	objectives	are	as	follows:	(1)	surveillance	for	rapid	detection	
of	CSFV	in	US	swine,	(2)	monitor	the	risk	of	introduction	of	CSF	
into	US	swine,	(3)	surveillance	of	international	CSF	status,	and	
(4)	surveillance	to	document	freedom	of	CSF	(71).	Unthrifty	pigs,	
considered	to	be	those	that	gain	weight	poorly	or	are	otherwise	
somewhat	 sickly,	 are	 often	 sold	 to	 off-market	 vendors.	APHIS	
Veterinary	 Services	 field	 staff	 or	 other	 cooperating	 personnel	
collect	 tonsil	 samples	 in	 these	markets	 as	 a	 way	 to	 survey	 for	
infectious	agents,	including	CSFV.	This	method	is	deemed	to	be	
an	 effective	 surveillance	 strategy	 as	 poor-doing	 pigs	 from	 sur-
rounding	regions	are	often	consolidated	in	these	markets,	which	
makes	for	an	efficient	means	of	sampling	sickly	pigs	from	a	wider	
geographical	 area.	 Furthermore,	 high-risk	 areas,	 designated	 by	
APHIS	 as	 regions	 with	 garbage	 feeding	 operations,	 backyard	
swine	operations,	feral	swine	hunting	clubs,	military	bases,	inter-
national	air	or	sea	ports,	farming	operations	utilizing	an	interna-
tional	labor	force,	and/or	corporations	engaging	in	international	
swine	movement,	are	subject	to	active	surveillance	protocols	via	
tonsil	collection;	25	states	are	considered	high	risk.	All	garbage	
feeder	operations	in	the	United	States	are	licensed	and	regularly	
inspected,	and	heat	treatment	of	all	feed	is	mandatory.	Texas	and	
Florida	 are	 considered	particularly	high	 risk,	 and	 as	 such,	 two	
swine	 slaughter	 establishments	 in	 Florida	 and	 three	 in	 Texas	
randomly	collect	blood,	which	is	sent	to	the	FADDL	for	further	
testing,	especially	from	pigs	in	the	southern	portion	of	each	state,	
light-weight	pigs,	or	those	in	transition.	This	active	surveillance	
for	CSFV	in	domestic	swine	could	readily	be	extended	to	include	
surveillance	for	ASFV	as	samples	are	already	being	collected	and	
transported	to	FADDL	for	screening	purposes.
Moreover,	feral	swine	are	also	surveyed	as	a	preventative	and	
early	 sentinel	 in	 the	event	of	a	CSFV	 intrusion.	For	fiscal	year	
2017,	USDA	APHIS	National	Feral	Swine	Damage	Management	
Program	 is	 rolling	 out	 a	 targeted	 surveillance	 plan	 in	 which	
existing	feral	swine	populations,	domestic	hog	production	areas,	
and	landfills	are	used	as	criteria	for	determining	priority	of	feral	
swine	 samples	 collected	 for	 disease	 surveillance.	 Counties	 are	
weighted	based	on	the	presence	or	absence	of	each	of	the	afore-
mentioned	criteria.	This	type	of	targeted	surveillance	is	crucial	to	
allow	for	the	efficient	use	of	time	and	resources	and	to	increase	
the	probability	of	detecting	an	outbreak	early	(106,	107).	Samples	
are	collected	via	culling	operations	as	well	as	from	hunter-killed	
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pigs,	 and	 serology	 is	 performed	 to	 evaluate	 the	 presence	 of	
CSFV	 antibodies.	 Again,	 expanding	 this	 program	 to	 include	
ASFV	screening	in	feral	swine	may	be	beneficial,	especially	if	the	
perceived	risk	of	ASFV	entering	the	United	States	increases,	as	it	
would	likely	contribute	to	early	detection	in	the	event	of	a	viral	
incursion	and	would	be	 far	 less	costly	 than	an	ASFV-exclusive	
active	surveillance	protocol.
Importantly,	 several	 strains	 of	 Ornithodoros	 soft	 ticks	 are	
found	in	regions	with	high	feral	swine	populations,	especially	
Texas,	 Florida,	 and	 Oklahoma	 (O. turicata)	 and	 California	
(O. coriaceus).	 Both	 of	 these	 tick	 species	 have	 been	 shown	
to	become	 infected	with	ASFV	and	O. coriaceus	 is	 capable	of	
transmitting	the	virus	to	susceptible	domestic	swine	>500 days	
after	infection	(33).	Ornithodoros	ticks	are	permissive	to	ASFV	
infection	with	varying	capacities	for	infection;	thus,	it	is	hypoth-
esized	that	other	Ornithodoros	species	ticks	found	in	the	United	
States	 are	 competent	ASFV	 vectors.	The	high	 density	 of	 feral	
and	domestic	swine	in	these	regions	and	a	strong	likelihood	for	
overlapping	distribution	with	potential	soft	tick	vectors	further	
the	notion	that	an	active	surveillance	protocol	may	be	useful	and	
contribute	to	early	detection	in	the	event	that	ASFV	emerges	in	
the	United	States.
It	is	important	to	note	that	much	of	the	spread	of	ASF	through	
Eastern	 Europe	 and	 the	 Caucuses	 region	 is	 likely	 driven	 by	
anthropogenic	factors,	such	as	the	movement	of	infected	pigs	and	
their	products	as	well	as	via	swill	feeding	(108).	However,	ticks	
cannot	 be	 overlooked	 as	 they	 are	 believed	 to	 have	maintained	
ASFV	 in	Portugal	 over	 a	 6-year	period	during	which	 time	 the	
country	was	declared	ASF	free	prior	to	the	re-emergence	of	the	
disease	 on	 a	 single	 farm	 (48).	The	 role	 of	 vectors	 in	 pathogen	
maintenance	and	transmission	events	is	often	poorly	understood,	
and	these	long-lived	ticks	may	play	a	crucial	role	in	conjunction	
with	human	activities	which	likely	facilitate	ASFV	spread.
Sampling	of	illegally	imported	and	subsequently	confiscated,	
suids,	 and	 their	 products	 would	 also	 provide	meaningful	 data	
relevant	to	the	types	of	pathogens	being	imported.	The	General	
Accounting	Office	(74)	estimated	that	1–3%	of	illegally	imported	
wildlife	carried	by	passengers	was	detected	and	1–10%	of	illegally	
imported	wildlife	in	declared	cargo	shipments.	Smith	et al.	(109)	
performed	 a	 pilot	 study	 evaluating	 zoonotic	 agents	 in	 confis-
cated	 animal	 products	 from	 John	 F.	 Kennedy	 airport	 in	 New	
York,	New	York,	and	found	that	multiple	strains	of	retroviruses	
and	herpesviruses	were	present	 in	 several	non-human	primate	
specimens.	Knowledge	relative	to	the	types	of	pathogens	entering	
the	United	States	in	illegally	imported	swine	products	would	be	
useful	 in	 understanding	 risk	 of	 both	 swine-specific	 pathogens	
and	zoonotic	organisms.
African	 swine	 fever	 presents	 a	 substantial	 threat	 to	 both	
domestic	and	wild	suid	species.	The	concern	of	viral	 introduc-
tion	in	the	United	States	has	contributed	to	the	implementation	
of	 a	 series	 of	 preventive	measures	designed	 for	 importation	of	
live	 animals	 and	 their	 products.	 Despite	 extensive	 research,	
knowledge	gaps	exist,	and	they	have	been	highlighted	as	areas	for	
future	evaluation.
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